Moral Panics & Societal Problems - By Elliot Whitelaw

“The moral panic concept, was symptomatic of problematical trends in the age in which it emerged, and it has excited critical reactions within the academic community.” (Hier, 2011, p. Foreword)

The processual model was designed by Stanley Cohen in the UK in the 1960s, and outlines a certain number of characteristics that need to be met in order for a social problem to be considered a moral panic.  The first being emergence, how have a group of people, an individual or a condition become a threat to societal values? This is followed by Media Inventory, which is where the mainstream media report on the panic in a certain way, ultimately vilifying the group, individual or condition in question and creating folk devils. Then moral entrepreneurs, such as politicians, bishops, editors and other right thinking people demand actions are taken to protect societal values. Soon after, experts relevant to the panic deliver their prognosis, and then solutions.  After this, coping and resolutions follow, action is taken and methods of dealing with the moral panic evolve gradually. Finally, the moral panic endures a state of fading away, where the moral panic disappears, submerges, or deteriorates. These factors are important because they allow a range of characteristics to be developed that allow for a better understanding of whether a new social problem can be considered a moral panic or not.

The mass media plays an integral role in the way a moral panic unfolds, often portraying a condition, individual or group of people in a way that society vilifies them and envisions them as folk devils. “Folk devils are conceptualized as symbolic or discursive representations of harm.” (Hier, 2011, p. 88). Cohen argues the media operate within a “control culture”, Where three common elements outline the way society reacts to the moral panic, these are; “diffusion, escalation and innovation.” (Thompson, 2005, p. 37). In Cohen’s theory, diffusion is defined as how control agents such as police authorities are drawn in to investigate and react to the problem. Escalation is described as dealing with the incident appropriately, for example protecting children during the video nasties moral panic, as they were seen as the group most at risk. Finally, innovation is described as those in a position of power are given new powers by politicians and the government to deal with the problem, for example laws being passed, such as in 1982 when the met police began seizing videos such as “Driller Killer” and “Cannibal Holocaust” during the first video nasties moral panic.

“The first published reference to a ‘moral panic’ was by the British sociologist Jock Young, in 1971, when discussing public concern about statistics showing an apparently alarming increase in drug abuse” (Thompson, 2005, p. 7). The two case studies in question are the moral panics regarding rave & ecstasy culture in the late 1980’s and onwards.

Rave and ecstasy culture could be considered a moral panic because it arguably fits into some of the definitive narratives in Cohen’s model. “Making its public debut in this country in 1988 in the shape of “acid house” parties held in warehouses, fields and clubs.” (Secondary source) (Critcher C. , 2017, p. 48).

The emergence of the rave and ecstasy moral panic adheres to the processual model, as the group in question are the youth of Britain. Leah Betts’ death was a key event in the timeline of the moral panic, as it illustrated to the general public how dangerous ecstasy use could be. “Leah Betts took the ecstasy pill which caused her death at her eighteenth birthday party.” (Matthew Collin, 2009, p. 319). This shocked the nation in 1995, as her father was a former police officer and her mother an anti-drugs volunteer. A young, white and rather affluent woman dying under such tragic circumstances led to rave culture becoming vilified.

The culture became a moral panic due to the mass medias representation of those who took part in the raves, which were often defined as a cover up for drug dealers. Associated with loud music, often at anti-social levels, and drug use, the British media vilified anyone who participated, as many were suggested to be participating in high levels of illegal drug consumption, which was feared to be lethal. This threatened societal values because many were worried the youth would turn into a self destructive, mindless generation.

The media acted independently or were used as a tool by the government in power to try and report in a way that would force their own agendas. “Over the first half of the nineties blaming youth and reducing complex social issues to simplistic sound bites went beyond constructions. It became a device of government.” (Parker, 1998, p. 8). Parker explains how the home secretary at the time (1993-1997), Michael Howard led an attack on the youth of Britain that although tarnished his reputation, made him appear as moral entrepreneur because he was calling for action. The media began reporting on rave culture in a way that vilified those who took part in it, The Sun ran one issue in October of 1988 with the headline, “Shoot these evil acid barons”, insuring nationwide that a negative attitude towards those who took part in the raves because they were supporting criminals.

Another reason the rave culture could be considered a moral panic is because of the coping and resolution that were adopted to deal with the threat to societal values. Laws were changed in order to give authorities more power. “Section 47 of the (CJPO) Act made it an offence to make preparations to hold, wait for or attend a rave; Section 45 gave the police powers to arrest, without a warrant, trespassers failing to leave the site of a rave after being asked to do so by a police officer; Section 49 gave the police powers to control traffic within a five mile radius of a rave, including the authority to stop vehicles at a roadblock.” (Henderson, 1997, p. 10).

The rave and ecstasy moral panic eventually faded away, which is expected in Cohen’s model. The panic subsided after a brief re-emergence in the mid 1990’s. However, some argue that the emergence of rave culture was merely a re-emergence of cultures that had existed before, “Others still maintain that rave and its predecessor Acid House are nothing new and are merely another link in the subcultural chain, replaying and reworking the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s.” (Thompson, 2005, p. 51).

The legacy left by rave culture was a considerable change in the laws, such as the Criminal Justice & Public Order act of 1994, which affected the growth of “club culture”, where raves became the norm and were held in clubs legally. “The government had either to bend their rules or break under the sheer weight of opposition. Even their core concerns - stemming the spread of drug culture and preventing organised criminals from consolidating their power base - went unresolved”. (Collin, 1998, p. 121)

However, the rave culture could not be considered a moral panic because it doesn’t adhere to all of the characteristics in Cohen’s model, as it is unclear which experts are identifiable to align with the processual model, supporting the argument that the processual model may be too crude to encompass the full range of factors needed to define a moral panic.

The second moral panic in question is video nasties. The first episode of the video nasties began in 1979 but became a larger problem when it was first used in a story in The Sunday Times in 1982. Then in 1983-1984 The Daily Mail & The Sunday Times began reporting frequently and fuelling the panic that the graphic nature of some videos were not suitable for the children of Britain. Shortly after this the panic disappeared for ten years and then re-emerged following the death of James Bugler in 1993. The two year old was taken from a shopping centre and was tortured and murdered brutally by two 10-year-old boys. 

In July of 1982, the Metropolitan Police force began seizing videos such as “Cannibal Holocaust” & “Driller Killer”, both extremely graphic and violent films.  The British Film Council then began age rating films in an attempt to make them less accessible to children under the age of eighteen.

The emergence of this led to not a physical group of people, condition or an individual becoming a folk devil, but a video formed from the advances of technology. There was no physical entity that could be portrayed as the folk devil, the closest to this were the shopkeepers who sold the videos because they were held legally accountable and could be punished. In 1983, it is estimated that one third of all British households had a VCR player, and this expansion coincided with the release of Hollywood horror films, hence why they were called video nasties.

The first complaints about the videos and what they were advertising was made in 1981, following this, The Mail featured the first story on the topic warning “More and more children, well used to video recorders in school, are catching on to the fact that their parents’ machines can give them the opportunity to watch the worst excess of sex and violence.” (Critcher H. P., 2013, p. 75).

In regards to media inventory, it is important to remember when discussing whether video nasties were a moral panic or young children committed not that prior to the Jamie Bulger case, a similar, and monstrous crime. In 1998, then 2 years old, Sharona Joseph was abducted and suffocated by a 12 year old. However, “Because the media did not employ the moralizing discourse there was little public reaction and no suggestion that it was part of a widespread social malaise.” (Thompson, 2005, p. 97).  This suggests that the media and the government construct moral panics. Petley states that police under the Obscene Publications Act outlawed video nasties before the Video Recordings Act of 1984 was passed. “There are no causal links whatsoever between Child’s Play 3 and the Bulger murder, as the police involved readily testify; there has been no wholesale U-turn by academics on the vexed question of media effects and Britain has one of the strictest regimes of film and video censorship in the western world.” (Petley, 1994, p. 52).

Although, evidence suggests that the media did create mass hysteria when they did report on the videos. Barker suggests that the way the media covered the saga led to it being visualised worse than it was in reality. In Barker’s book, Petley suggests moral panics are in fact more of a political issue than they are an issue that is posing a threat to the morality of those within society. “The ‘video nasty’ issue was deliberately and explicitly used as an illustration of the dangers of the so-called ‘underclass’.” (Barker, 2013, p. 96).

Therefore, there is evidence to suggest the media play the biggest part in initiating a moral panic, and they do this to add more control and power to their regimes. By creating a form of hysteria and panic in society, individuals will be more likely to conform and listen to those in power, especially the government, as they are the supposed entity that ensures we live in safe environments.

Moral entrepreneurs such as Mary Whitehouse were the epitome of a moral entrepreneur, leading the campaigns to ban video nasties, forcing the government and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to act upon banning these videos under the Obscene Publications Act (OPA) of 1959. They also took the form of Christians during this moral panic, as they campaigned that society must protect the innocent children, validating their argument further as this would then ultimately save society, as children wouldn’t grow up and become desensitised to violence and think it was acceptable.

There were no experts during the first video nasties moral panic, as the situation was so clear-cut – However teachers and psychiatrists fulfilled the expert role and argued one point: these awful videos were harming our children and presenting them with such violence will cause them to re-enact it.

In Cohens model, for something to be considered a moral panic it must show how society developed a mechanism in order to cope with the panic, this is evident in the video nasties panic because of law changes. After it’s emergence in 1979, there were several changes to the laws in Britain that prove this theory, “From June 1982 onwards, politicians begin to man the moral barricades, with a number of questions about videos being asked in both the Commons and Lords.” (Critcher H. P., 2013, p. 76).  In 1982, the metropolitan police began seizing videos and then in 1984, following the Video Recordings Act it became an offence for anyone to sell/rent video nasties to anyone under the age of eighteen, and if caught doing so, could be met with a £20,000 fine. Following the Video Recordings Act, in 1985, as a part of Video Recordings (Labelling) act, the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) began classifying films in an attempt to end the moral panic.

Finally, during both episodes of the video nasties panic, the mass hysteria eventually disappeared and the media lost interest. This is a characteristic of the processual and supports the argument that this model is valid.  It is important to understand that the second episode, which followed after the murder of James Bulger in 1993, confirms the media can create a moral panic, “The media tend to shape their treatment of events according to conventional formats. They also tend to develop a story line in terms of existing discourses, reflecting an assumed or already constructed public opinion.” (Thompson, 2005, p. 100).

To conclude, in order for something to be considered a moral panic, it must adhere to the six characteristics that Cohen uses to define his processual model of a moral panic. Both rave & ecstasy culture and video nasties partially adhere to this model.

Rave & ecstasy culture aligns with numerous factors of the processual model. There was a perceived threat that the youth of Britain would cause serious physical and mental harm to themselves through the use of ecstasy and attending raves. The media inventory was the mass media describing the raves like they were a breeding ground for drug dealing, therefore criminalising the culture; this coincided with political campaigns being met with little opposition. Society coped and resolved the issue by implementing strict legal measures. Finally, the panic faded away after the culture became normalised and the genres of music used transferred over to legal venues and nightclubs.

In regards to the video nasties moral panic, in a similar sense it could be considered a moral panic because it aligned with the processual model, the threat emerged when there was no identifiable person or group responsible for possibly desensitising the nations children and exposing them to such violence as seen in the films. The media inventory created mass hysteria via it’s reporting on the issue. Following this, moral entrepreneurs emerged such as Mary Whitehouse who validated their campaigns by arguing that children were in danger.  Experts then emerged in the form of teachers and psychiatrists, though they were not necessary because the situation was so clear.  Society coped by introducing fines and possible prison sentences and restricting those under the age of eighteen being able to purchase the videos, though this did not necessarily mean they couldn’t get hold of them another way. And finally, the video nasties moral panic eventually faded away after the media lost interest and stopped reporting on it.

Overall, the processual model designed by Cohen is arguably valid and not crude in determining a moral panic, though the video nasties and rave & ecstasy culture episodes may not have entirely adhered to the six factors in the model, Cohens work allows sociologists and other academics to make sense of whether something is a moral panic or not. After all, a moral panic is a threat to morality and nothing more, but with the processual model, it allows those researching the characteristics of the phenomena to be defined logically.

The model takes into account the most important factors during the lifespan of a moral panic, from its emergence to it’s subsiding. An essential characteristic that Cohen uses is the role of the media, and ultimately how it represents the “underclass” in society, and how they can be criminalised and vilified in order to continue validating certain political agendas. “Of the way in which ultra-conservative versions of the theory have been assiduously pedalled by sections of the British press, the deliberate exclusion of a growing number of people from being considered as members of society” (Petley, 1994, p. 100).

Overall, the processual model is valid for defining a moral panic, as it encompasses all the factors and characteristics that are relevant to a moral panic and allowing it to make sense. There could arguably be a wider range of factors in the future that could be added or substituted into the model, but the processual model is currently valid and encompasses a range of relevant factors that allow a new social problem to be defined as a moral panic or not.

Bibliography

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Critcher, H. P. (2013). Moral Panics in the Contemporary World . New York: Bloomsbury Academic .

Henderson, S. i. (1997). AIDS. London: Falmer Press.

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